Abstract-With millimeter wave (mmWave) wireless communication envisioned to be the key enabler of next generation high data rate wireless networks, security is of paramount importance. While conventional security measures in wireless networks operate at a higher layer of the protocol stack, physical layer security utilizes unique device dependent hardware features to identify and authenticate legitimate devices. In this work, we identify that the manufacturing tolerances in the antenna arrays used in mmWave devices contribute to a beam pattern that is unique to each device, and to that end we propose a novel device fingerprinting scheme based on the unique beam pattern of different codebooks used by the mmWave devices. Specifically, we propose a fingerprinting scheme with multiple access points (APs) to take advantage of the rich spatial-temporal information of the beam pattern. We perform comprehensive experiments with commercial off-the-shelf mmWave devices to validate the reliability performance of our proposed method under various scenarios. We also compare our beam pattern feature with a conventional physical layer feature namely power spectral density feature (PSD). To that end, we implement PSD feature based fingerprinting for mmWave devices. We show that the proposed multiple APs scheme is able to achieve over 99% identification accuracy for stationary LOS and NLOS scenarios and significantly outperform the PSD feature fingerprinting method. For mobility scenario, the overall identification accuracy is 99%. In addition, we perform security analysis of our proposed beam pattern fingerprinting system and PSD fingerprinting system by studying the feasibility of performing impersonation attacks. We design and implement an impersonation attack mechanism for mmWave wireless networks using state-of-theart 60 GHz software defined radios. We discuss our findings and their implications on the security of the mmWave wireless networks.
I. INTRODUCTION

W
ITH the proliferation of mmWave wireless communication, enormous amount of data will be transmitted over wireless. It is estimated that by 2020 there will be 38 billion connected devices with more than 60% of global mobile traffic through WiFi [1] . The majority of this traffic will be driven by next generation mmWave wireless networks such as 802.11 ad/ay. Hence security is critical for mmWave wireless networks. Existing security protocols for wireless standards including mmWave are implemented at the software level and are traditionally cryptographic based schemes such as WPA, WPA2-PSK and they are proven to be vulnerable to several attacks such as DoS attack [2] , injection attack [3] , spoofing attack [4] and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. Also, mmWave communication is inherently considered to be secure due to the directionality of the antenna beams and attacks such as MITM is considered to be difficult. However, commercial mmWave devices currently available have irregular beam patterns and high side lobes [5] which makes it possible for an attacker to perform attacks such as MITM.
Attacks such as [6] and [7] expose the security vulnerability of present mmWave wireless networks and could have severe impact on the security of the system as they can not be prevented using higher layer security protocols [6] , [7] . Hence there exists a strong need for security measures in addition to the conventional security methods that are currently used.
Recently physical layer security has become a promising solution to address the aforementioned security issues and augment the security of wireless systems. Wireless waveforms transmitted by the device are stamped with unique features that originate in the physical layer of the transmitter that could be potentially used to identify and authenticate devices. Such unique features are generated by the imperfections along the hardware chain of the transmitter. The features introduced by the hardware are difficult to forge unlike software based security schemes and could be used in conjunction with the existing higher layer security mechanisms if they are reliable and stable [8] .
Current RF physical layer features are either 1) data dependent like transient and preamble based features that are prone to signal replay attack, or 2) low-dimensional like modulation based features which can be easily forged and have limited capacity in terms of number of devices that can be enrolled, which makes them weak and limited in practical usage.
Existing works on RF fingerprinting were proposed for conventional sub-6 GHz wireless band and physical layer security schemes for mmWave communications remain largely unexplored. The propagation characteristics of mmWave signals add a unique dimension to the fingerprinting problem. To overcome propagation losses at higher frequencies, mmWave devices uses beamforming enabled by antenna arrays. Now the natural question arises: Can the antenna arrays in mmWave devices generate unique fingerprints that could be used to reliably identify and authenticate mmWave devices? The antenna arrays, owing to the errors and tolerances in manufacturing processes (Sec II-B), generate distinct beam patterns that are unique among devices. Typically mmWave devices use a set of beam patterns and find the best one to use through a process known as beam searching. The mobility of the user or device orientation change exposes different angular views of these beam patterns. We propose to leverage this spatial-temporal characteristic of the beam pattern used by the user device. We show that these device dependent beam patterns can be learned and reliably employed for device identification. To the best of our knowledge, no work exists in the literature that utilizes the spatial beam patterns of the mmWave antenna arrays for RF fingerprinting. The proposed beam pattern feature has the following properties: 1) data independent as beam pattern does not depend on the signal being transmitted, 2) high dimensional and 3) resilient to impersonation attacks.
A. Contribution
Our contributions can be summarized as follows: 1) We identify that the fabrication process of the antenna array and the phase shifters used by mmWave devices introduce unique variations of beam patterns among the devices. Motivated by this observation, we propose a novel spatial-temporal beam feature for mmWave fingerprinting based on the beam patterns swept by the mmWave device during the beam searching process.
To exploit the rich spatial-temporal feature in the beam pattern sweep during the beam searching phase, we propose a multiple APs architecture for RF fingerprinting mmWave devices and provide an optimal deployment strategy for the APs. 2) We demonstrate the reliability and robustness of the proposed spatial-temporal beam feature through extensive experiments with commercial mmWave devices. In addition, we compare our proposed feature with an existing conventional RF feature. To that end, we implement PSD based device fingerprinting scheme for mmWave devices. Our proposed fingerprinting system achieves a very high identification accuracy under stationary LOS and NLOS scenarios when compared to the conventional RF feature. We also studied the impact of mobility on the performance of beam pattern feature. Moreover, our proposed fingerprinting scheme does not need additional signal processing or hardware as opposed to the conventional feature which typically requires complex signal processing and expensive hardware owing to the high bandwidth of the mmWave signal. 3) We perform security analysis of our proposed mmWave feature by studying its resilience to impersonation attacks. To that end, we implement impersonation attack on the fingerprinting system using state-of-the art mmWave software defined radio (SDR) and show that with multiple APs, impersonation attacks on the beam pattern feature can be successfully thwarted. On the other hand, we show that the conventional feature is vulnerable to impersonation attacks thus severely limiting its practical usage.
B. Related Work
Several works exist in the literature that investigate the RF fingerprints for physical layer identification and classification. Authors in [9] use the turn-on and turn-off transient part of the RF signal for fingerprinting. However, it requires expensive signal acquisition hardware thus prohibiting its practical usage. The approach in [10] uses frequency error, SYNC correlation, I/Q offset, magnitude error and phase error features extracted from IEEE 802.11 frames and is shown to achieve classification accuracy of over 99%. Even though such features are comparatively easier to extract, they are proven to be vulnerable to signal and feature replay attacks [11] . The authors in [12] achieve 0% classification error rate on RFID devices using modulation and spectral features.
Very limited work exists in the literature that studies the attacks on physical layer fingerprinting methods. The work in [11] experimentally demonstrates signal replay and feature replay attacks on IEEE 802.11 devices. It shows that low dimensional features such as frame frequency offset or IQ origin offset can be replayed using high end arbitrary waveform generators.
All these works on RF fingerprinting are proposed for sub-6 GHz wireless technologies and to the best of the author knowledge, no work exists in the literature for fingerprinting commercial mmWave devices. Also, the above mentioned transient and modulation based fingerprints are constrained in feature space, i.e., they rely on low dimensional feature space leading to constraints on the number of devices successfully identified by those features. Recently authors in [13] proposed fingerprinting the received power between different transmit and receive beam pattern combinations to speed up the beam searching mechanism in mmWave networks. Authors in [14] proposed to fingerprint the strongest beams obtained for all combinations of transmit and receive beam patterns for a mobile user over time to form a database. The fingerprint database is trained using a convolutional neural network (CNN) to learn the position of devices. In this work, distinct from the above mentioned RF fingerprinting schemes where the spatial features are typically not considered or are used for localization and to accelerate the beam searching process, we propose a novel high dimensional RF fingerprinting scheme based on the spatial signatures of the beam pattern used by the mmWave devices.
C. Organization
We discuss the proposed mmWave fingerprinting system architecture and feature origin in Sec. II. In Sec. III, we describe our system implementation and testbed set up. In Sec. IV, we present comprehensive experimental results for various practical scenarios and discuss the findings. Section V discusses impersonation attacks on the proposed mmWave feature. Section VI discusses conclusions.
II. SYSTEM DESIGN
This section describes the overall system architecture, source of proposed beam pattern feature, AP deployment strategy and beam pattern feature extraction protocol.
A. System Architecture and Operational Framework
We consider a mmWave wireless network with multiple APs and clients deployed in an indoor environment as shown in Fig. 1 . The APs and clients follow the mmWave standard (e.g., 802.11ad) and perform beam searching to establish directional communication with each other. The APs utilize a unique hardware dependent beam pattern feature (Sec. II-B) to authenticate the clients joining the network. The beam pattern feature is extracted during the beam searching phase that already exists in the mmWave standards such as 802.11ad [15] , 802.11ay [16] and 5G-NR [17] and does not introduce any additional protocol and signal processing overhead. All the APs are connected to a back-end server through a backhaul network or Gigabit Ethernet. The back-end server runs the classification and identification algorithm to authenticate the clients. The system operates in a two-stage process: 1) learning stage and 2) identification stage. During the learning stage, devices are enrolled and beam pattern feature databases for the enrolled devices are built. Each device is given an identity label L i , i = 1, 2, · · · , N with N being the number of clients. The APs initiate the beam searching mechanism (sector level sweep in 802.11ad) periodically and also triggered by device mobility, extract the beam pattern feature vector and communicate the feature vector and device identity label L i to the backend server. The learning stage is a one-time process and is completed before the client devices are authenticated and admitted to the system. The backend server builds the beam pattern feature database for each enrolled client L i and performs learning/training using the learning method discussed in Sec. II-F. During the identification stage, the device that intends to join the network, performs beam searching with the APs. Each AP extracts the beam pattern feature vector of the device to be identified and the backend server verifies it against the feature of the claimed identity of the device.
B. Phased Array Beam Pattern Feature: A Closer Look
In this section we take a closer look at the antenna arrays found in commercial mmWave devices to identify the source of fingerprint due to beam pattern variations. Without loss of generality, assume a 2D planar antenna array which is popularly used for mmWave applications. The beam pattern of the rectangular antenna array where the elements are uniformly arranged in the x y-plane is given by
where a = sinθ λ and f el (θ, φ) is the radiation field of the individual element in the antenna array. θ and φ are the azimuth and the elevation angles, respectively. λ is the wavelength, M x and M y are the number of antenna elements along the x-axis and y-axis, respectively. w m,n,k = α m,n e j δ m,n is the complex excitation of the m, nth element to form the kth beam pattern with α m,n and δ m,n being the amplitude and phase excitations of m, nth element. From (1), the beam pattern of the antenna array is a function of the radiation field of individual elements f el (θ, φ), amplitude and phase applied to each of the elements w m,n,k and the array geometry term e j 2π(md x acosφ+nd y asinφ) . In addition to these, the beam pattern of the array is also affected by the manufacturing tolerances and manufacturing errors that arise due to masking, etching and dielectric constant tolerances during antenna array fabrication.
The first source of error in the antenna array fabrication is due to the dielectric properties of the substrate used in the antenna. The antenna patch resonance frequency depends on the relative permittivity of the material used for substrate and is given by
where c is speed of light in vacuum, L is the patch length and r is the relative permittivity. Some of the popular substrates used for mmWave antenna are Rogers ® RO3003, RO3203 [18] , and LTCC Ferro A6-S [19] . The relative permittivity r of these substrates has a tolerance value that deviates from the specified r . E.g., Ferro A6-S substrate has a r of 5.9 ± 0.2 [19] .
A second source of variations in the beam patterns is the dimensional tolerance of the antenna fabrication process. The manufacturing error increases considerably at higher frequencies due to reduced antenna size and also due to increasing substrate dielectric r (antenna patch width decreases with increase in r ). Due to the shrinkage in dimension during the fabrication process and the errors that depend on the tolerance of the process used to fabricate, the final dimensions of the antenna are not the same across different batches. The Ferro A6-S substrate typically used for mmWave antenna fabrication has a x-y shrinkage as high as 15% ± 2 [19] .
As shown in (1), phase shifts are applied to each element of the antenna array to steer the beam toward intended direction. The phase shifters used for beamforming in commercial mmWave devices are typically low cost, low resolution with high phase errors. The i th phase shifter has a phase deviation error of ± δ i from the actual phase value and the error is independent among the phase shifters used in different antenna elements. If θ i is the ideal phase shift, the actual phase shift applied to the i th element is θ i ± δ i . The 3-bit phase shifter in [20] for 60 GHz has a maximum phase error of 10.4 • and rms error of 5.7 • .
All these errors due to tolerances associated with antenna fabrication process as well as the phase shifters, introduce unique hardware dependent beam pattern variation among antenna arrays even with the same architecture and geometry.
1) Antenna Array Design and Simulation:
To further understand the effect of the antenna manufacturing tolerances and phase shifter errors on the beam pattern variations of mmWave antenna array, we design a 6 × 6 slot-coupled microstrip patch antenna array using COMSOL ® [21] as shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 . The resonant frequency of the array is 30 G H z. The dimensions of the individual antenna elements are as follows: The substrate dimensions are 4mm × 4mm. The patch length and width are 1.7mm and 1.63mm, respectively. The slot width and length are 0.1mm and 0.605mm, respectively. The feed line is of width 0.11mm and the length of the extended feed line is 0.52mm. The thickness of the patch and feed substrate is 0.1mm. The dielectric constant of the substrate is 5.9. The spacing between the antenna element is 4mm along the X and Y directions. The phase applied to the individual antenna elements is 0 • . As discussed previously, the variations of the antenna beam pattern feature come from the manufacturing process of the antenna array. Hence, in our simulation, we vary the above mentioned antenna array properties within tolerance limits [22] , [23] , [19] to understand the effect of antenna fabrication process variations on the beam pattern. We consider a Ferro A6-S substrate with r = 5.9 ± 0.2. The X, Y shrinkage of the LTCC process is assumed to be 15% and the phase shifter error is 5 • . Fig. 4 shows the beam pattern variations due to the substrate dielectric tolerance, dimension shrinkage, antenna element spacing variation and phase shifter errors. We can see that the tolerances associated with the materials and fabrication process introduce variations in the beam pattern of the antenna array.
2) Feature Uniqueness: For practical usage of device fingerprinting, the proposed beam pattern feature must be unique among devices and scalable. From our simulated beam pattern in Fig. 4 , we see that errors due to tolerances of the antenna manufacturing process and phase shifters result in variation of the beam pattern among different antenna arrays. The variations are found to be as high as 3.2 d B. Through our experiments in Sec. IV, we show through classification accuracy that these unique beam pattern variations among devices of same manufacturer and across manufacturers can be learned with high accuracy.
3) Feature Stability: Another important characteristic of the suitability of a fingerprint for device identification is stability [24] . The obtained fingerprint should be invariant over time.
To verify the stability of our proposed beam pattern feature, we set up a Talon AD7200 router as client and recorded 200 beam searching beacons everyday from it over a period of 1 week. Fig. 6 shows that the extracted beam pattern feature is stable over a long period of time.
4) User Capacity: Previously, we discussed uniqueness of the beam pattern feature among different antenna arrays with identical geometries and materials used. However a natural question arises: how many such devices (antenna arrays) can have unique beam patterns? If the number of devices enrolled in the system exceeds the capacity of the system, then the beam pattern features of devices will overlap decreasing the accuracy of the identification system. Therefore, it is important to study the user capacity of the proposed beam pattern feature based on the characteristics of the antenna array and the limitations of the fingerprinting device. As discussed previously, the beam pattern of the antenna array significantly deviates from the theoretical beam pattern due to the errors introduced by the tolerances associated with materials used and the fabrication process. With the antenna array and parameters in Sec. II-B1, we perform parametric sweep simulation using COMSOL ® . The resulting beam patterns for various combinations of the parameters is shown in Fig. 5 . Here we are interested in finding the variance of the beam pattern f θ due to the errors. Also it should be noted, since beam pattern is a function of θ , the maximum deviation of the beam pattern is also a function of θ . As discussed in Sec. II-D, we learn multiple angular directions θ of the beam pattern f θ of the user. We find that, for the antenna array in Sec. II-B1, the maximum variation of the beam pattern f θ for all θ to be 3.2 d B.
Recall that, the beampattern of the device f θ is obtained at the receiver by measuring the signal power at θ . Hence the resolution of the digitizer used at the receiver plays an important role in further determining the user capacity of the system. The analog-to-digital converter (ADC) has a maximum voltage V max and minimum voltage V min it can sample without distortion with full scale V F S = V max − V min . The number of discrete voltage levels the ADC can output depends on the number of bits n it uses to represent a voltage level. For a n bits ADC, the voltage resolution v is given by V F S 2 n −1 . Taking into account the voltage resolution of a 13-bit ADC, for a beam pattern the maximum number of users the fingerprinting system can support is 3200. Since our fingerprinting system uses all the codebooks transmitted during beam searching phase, the user capacity scales with the number of beam patterns used. For a mmWave device with N codebooks, the maximum user capacity is 3200 × N.
C. AP Deployment
From a particular spatial position, each AP can only obtain a single angular view of each beam pattern used by the client. Deploying multiple APs in the area will allow the APs to have multiple views of the beam pattern of the client. But if the APs are deployed too close to each other or deployed in a position with obstacles, the beam pattern feature obtained by them might not offer distinct information. Also, mmWave systems are known to experience dynamic signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) variations due to mobility and blockage. Therefore the deployment position of APs in our proposed mmWave device identification system plays an important role. The APs have to be deployed such that the device to be identified is in the signal coverage area. In this section, we discuss a practical deployment strategy for the APs.
1) Optimal Deployment:
The APs are to be deployed in an area U . For a certain user position P u , the probability the user is in the coverage area of the AP, i.e., the beacons from the user reach the AP can be expressed as,
where A i is the coverage area of AP i and T is the threshold for the signal to be received. S N R(P u ) is the SNR at P u . The user location P u is assumed to follow a certain probability distribution with density f (P u ). We assume the user's movement follows a mobility model as in [25] with P d being the probability the user departs the coverage area. Therefore the probability the user and the AP are able to successfully receive each other's signal is given by P cov,mobilit y = (1 − P d )P cov . For multiple APs, the connection probability for the i th AP is given by 
Therefore for the user and AP to successfully receive each other's beacon signals, the APs can be deployed so as to maximize the signal coverage probability. I.e.,
The optimal positions of the APs for the deployment area shown in Fig.7a is found by solving (2) . To reduce the complexity in searching for the optimal AP positions P AP,i , we can solve (2) for predefined user supplied AP positions known through environment familiarity or divide the deployment area into grids and provide the center of the grid locations as user supplied AP positions. We used the grid approach to find the AP positions that maximizes (2).
2) Experiment Validation:
We compare the AP deployment solution from (2) with a random deployment strategy. The SNR of the client to each of the AP is measured at the AP and averaged across all the APs. Fig. 7b plots the CCDF of signal coverage for different client mobility scenarios. We set the minimum SNR required to receive the beam searching beacon to 12 dB. We see that, both the random and the optimal strategies exceed the SNR requirement, however the optimal strategy exceeds 25 dB SNR whereas random deployment could only achieve 15 dB SNR 90% of the time. For the mobility experiment, we see that the optimal strategy exceeds the SNR requirement for 95% of the time whereas the random deployment exceeds the SNR requirement only 75% of the time. The signal quality gained through environment aware optimal AP deployment strategy directly translates to improved identification accuracy for the devices.
D. Feature Extraction Protocol
Now, having discussed the source of our proposed beam pattern feature, its uniqueness and potential applicability to mmWave device fingerprinting, how do we measure the beam pattern in practical scenarios? MmWave devices transmit beacons through each of their sectors with unique beam patterns. For e.g., the Talon AD7200 router transmits 32 different beam patterns in each of its 32 sectors during beam searching, 
in the vector F θ 1,i is contributed by a distinct angle θ 1,i in one of the k ∈ K beam patterns used by the user device during beam searching. When multiple APs are available as shown in 
Recall that, each AP only has a distinct view θ of a particular beam pattern k. We illustrate this scenario where the devices are stationary with respect to the APs. 
1) Stationary Devices:
For a stationary scenario with fixed device orientation angle relative to the APs, the beam pattern vector F θ m,i does not change with respect to the device-AP direction. Fig. 9a show such a scenario where the orientation in terms of best sector ID from the user to AP direction remains same for 120 secs. AP 1, AP 2 and AP 3 always see best sector 2, 7, and 16 respectively from the user device. The APs could simply extract the beam pattern vector F θ m,i of the K codebooks over several beam searching periods and build the fingerprint database for that device. However, if the device moves or the orientation of the device changes with respect to the APs, then the beam pattern fingerprint database needs to be updated as the beam pattern feature vector F θ m,i changes with change in orientation of the device with respect to the AP. To authenticate a mobile user, the beam pattern f k θ of the kth codebook for all feasible θ must be measured. Next, we discuss mobility scenario under which multiple views of a codebook k could be learned.
2) Beam Pattern Feature Due to Mobility: MmWave devices initiate the beam searching process whenever the best beam found during the previous beam searching phase becomes outdated due to device mobility or orientation change. When the device moves or orientation changes, the angle θ i of the kth codebook of the user device seen by the AP changes as shown in Fig. 8 . A simple rotation of the device by d degrees from initial orientation θ will result in beam pattern f (θ+d) at the AP. Can we use device mobility to learn the beam pattern of the codebooks used by the devices? To answer this, we performed experiments with APs deployed in the optimal position (Sec. II-C) in the environment and orientation angle in terms of best sector ID of the user with respect to each of the AP is measured for 100s of random user mobility. We see 
E. Mobility vs. Multiple APs
We discussed in Sec. II-C and Sec. II-D how employing multiple APs and the user device mobility helps in learning the rich spatial features of the beam patterns used by the devices. Here we discuss the trade-off among multiple APs, mobility and security implications.
• In a single AP system, the AP can only use one distinct view of the user beam pattern to authenticate it which makes the system vulnerable to impersonation attack as shown in Sec. V-A. Employing multiple APs would allow the APs to utilize multiple views of the user beam pattern to authenticate it which drastically improves the security of the system against impersonation attacks. However, multiple APs increases the infrastructure cost of the system.
• One way to reduce the cost and increase the security is to take advantage of device mobility. If the user is mobile, a single AP is sufficient and the AP could wait until it learns more distinct views in a beam pattern used by the user and proceed to authenticate the clients. In this way, it will be hard for the attacker to know the number of views used by the AP for authentication and spoof it.
F. Classification Architecture
Given a set of beam pattern features and associated target device IDs for each of those features, the objective of the classification problem is to learn a function or model that uniquely maps the beam pattern feature to its originating device. We model the mmWave device identification task as a multi-class classification problem. The input to the classifier is the beam patterns extracted during the beam searching process. The outputs are corresponding class labels. We use a 4 layer convolutional neural network (CNN) architecture for our classification system. The network consists of two 1D convolutional layers and two dense layers with ReLu activation function and a fully connected softmax layer. . To train the network, the fingerprint database is randomly split into training set and validation set. The training is validated using the validation set for each epoch of training. An early stopping criterion is utilized to stop the training when the validation loss does not minimize after 5 number of evaluations of the validation set. The CNN is implemented in Python using Keras [26] and trained on an Intel Core i7-5500U machine.
III. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION AND TEST-BED DEVELOPMENT
In this section, we describe our system implementation and a testbed we set up for mmWave RF fingerprinting. Fig. 10 shows a real-world application scenario where a mmWave wireless network is deployed with multiple APs and multiple users connected to the wireless network. For the rest of the discussion we refer to the APs as Alice 1, Alice 2, and so on and users as Bob 1, Bob 2, and so on. Without loss of generality, we assume that Bob 1 is connected to Alice 1 after successful completion of authentication procedure using the proposed RF fingerprinting. Mallory M is a malicious node that wants to gain unauthorised access to the network by forging the identity of legitimate node Bob 1. For the scenario described, first we discuss the reliability of the proposed beam pattern fingerprint in enabling Alices to authenticate legitimate Bobs under various scenarios. Next, we analyse the security impact of the system by evaluating the ability of Mallory to impersonate the identity of legitimate node Bob 1 by performing signal replay attack. The details of the attack model are discussed in Sec V.
Before proceeding to discuss the reliability and security analysis, we detail the mmWave devices, experiment setting and signal acquistion method in detail.
A. mmWave Devices
Here we present the mmWave devices used for reliability and security analysis experiments.
1) Alice and Bob:
We have evaluated the reliability and security of our proposed fingerprinting method discussed in Sec. II on commercially available mmWave devices. We conduct experiments on the following devices: 3 TP-Link Talon AD7200 routers, 3 Netgear Nighthawk X10 Smart WiFi routers, 1 Acer Travelmate P446M laptop with Qualcomm 60 GHz NIC and 6 Intel Tri-band 18625 NICs equipped with antenna model antenna-M 10101-R. The devices are labeled as follows: Talon1, Talon2, Talon3, Netgear1, Netgear2, Acer1, Intel1, Intel2, Intel3, Intel4, Intel5, Intel6. All these devices follow the 802.11ad standard and perform beam searching procedure as outlined in [15] . We use 802.11ad based devices since at present they are the only mmWave devices that are available in the market. Nevertheless, the proposed method and the findings in our experiments are applicable to other mmWave wireless standards such as IEEE 802.11ay and 5G-NR as they also utilize antenna array and beam searching mechanism to establish directional communication.
2) Attacker Mallory: The attacker M uses one X60 node [27] , to record the transmissions from legitimate device and retransmit them. X60 nodes are based on the 60 GHz software defined radio. The X60 node has a Si-Beam 60 GHz antenna array. The antenna array has 12 transmit elements and 12 receive elements with reconfigurable codebooks. The codebooks can be configured through setting the phase of each element of the antenna array. In our experiments, we use codebook 12 with beam pattern shown in Fig. 19a . Before performing the attack, the RF chain in the transmitter is calibrated. To process the signal from the ADC as well as to transmit baseband signals through the X60 testbed, an FPGA module is designed using Labview. The FPGA module interfaces with the ADC of the X60 node while in the receiver mode and interfaces to the DAC of the X60 node while in the transmitter mode.
B. Signal Acquisition
Since the signal strength measurements made during the beam searching process is not available outside of the firmware for most of the devices other than TP-Link Talon AD7200 [28] , therefore to maintain uniformity, in all our experiments, we receive the beam patterns swept during beam searching phase using VubiQ 60GHz mmWave receiver. We noticed that the mmWave devices we used in our experiments use channel 2 (60.48 GHz) of the 60 GHz band to perform beam searching. The VubiQ receiver is tuned to 60.48 GHz and it downconverts the received signal to analog baseband. The analog baseband signal is sampled using an Agilent oscilloscope. The oscilloscope is controlled by a Matlab script to acquire the signal and save them in the hard drive.
IV. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We implement the proposed beam pattern fingerprinting system and evaluate its effectiveness in various settings. We compare our beam pattern fingerprint with another conventional fingerprint method namely PSD fingerprint. To that end, we implement PSD feature based fingerprinting for mmWave devices. Before proceeding to evaluate our beam pattern feature, we first present the PSD feature extraction method.
Spectral Feature: We use PSD of the received signal as a feature for device classification and identification. The PSD is a frequency domain feature and is estimated at the baseband of the received signal. Let y(n) be the received signal. The normalized spectral fingerprint S(n) is given by Feature Extraction and Classification Method: The PSD is obtained from the preamble part of the received signal. We use beacons transmitted by the mmWave devices during the beam searching process to extract the PSD feature. The proposed method is applicable to all mmWave wireless standards and in this section, we focus on 802.11ad standard since we use 802.11ad devices for our experiments. 802.11ad devices transmit the control PHY preamble [15] during the beam searching process. The preamble part of the beacon transmitted during beam searching consists of short training (STF) field and channel estimation (CE) field. The STF consists of 48 repetitions of length 128 Golay sequence Gb 128 followed by a single −Gb 128 Golay sequence and a −Ga 128 Golay sequence. We use the STF and CE part of the preamble for PSD feature extraction. The beginning of the beacon frame is detected by the normalized auto-correlation of the known STF sequence with the received beacon frame [29] . Fig. 11a shows the preamble correlation to detect the beginning of the beacon frame. Once the frame is detected, the STF and CE part of the frame are used for PSD estimation. The estimated PSD feature for three of the devices is shown in Fig. 11b . The feature vector length is 1 × N F FT where NFFT is the number of FFT points used to compute PSD. The classification method described in section II-F is used for PSD feature classification and identification with the input dimension of the convolutional neural network set to 1 × N F FT .
Next we proceed to discuss the reliability of our proposed beam pattern fingerprint and compare with the PSD fingerprint in terms of classification and identification accuracy.
A. Experimental Setting and Metrics
For the reliability analysis experiments, we broadly classify our experimental setting into the following scenarios: 1) stationary LOS, 2) stationary non line-of-sight (NLOS), 3) mobility. All the experiments are performed in the indoor laboratory area with floor plan shown in Fig. 7a . For all the experiments, the locations of the APs are obtained from Sec. II-C and fixed. They are denoted as AP1, AP2 and AP3 in Fig. 7a . To evaluate our proposed beam pattern feature, we present the following metrics: 1) average accuracy metric which is the ratio of correctly predicted observations to the total predicted observations, 2) Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve which is obtained by plotting the true positive rate (TPR) against the false positive rate (FPR) for various thresholds and 3) Equal Error Rate (EER), an operating point in ROC at which false accept rate (FAR) = false reject rate (FRR). Lower the EER value, better is the system performance. For the ROC curves we provide macro-average and micro-average, and area under the curve (AUC). Micro-average is obtained by the average of individual true positives of a N class system and is given by mi cro − aver age = T P 1 +T P 2 +···T P N F P 1 +F P 2 +···F P N . In macro-average, the performance of each of the class is averaged and is given by macro − aver age =
. AUC is defined as the measure of separability between classes.
B. Classification Results
Training Size and Classification Accuracy: In this section we experimentally evaluate the number of training feature vectors needed to train the classifier in Sec. II-F to achieve a certain overall accuracy and in doing so we seek to answer the following question: How well is the classifier in Sec. II-F able to distinguish between devices of same manufacturer and across manufacturers? We vary the training size for each evaluation while keeping the testing size fixed at 6000 feature vectors (500 per class) and calculate the overall classification accuracy metric. Fig. 12 shows the classification accuracy versus training samples required per class. For the beam pattern feature, we see that with 3 APs less than 50 training samples per class are required to achieve an accuracy of over 99%. For the PSD feature, the number of training samples required depends on the FFT size. For 128 FFT size, the overall accuracy saturates at 98.5% at 350 training samples. For 256, 1024 and 4096 FFT size, the overall accuracy saturated at 99% for 350 training samples. For training samples per class above 350, the classification accuracy did not improve for increasing training sample size. For lower training samples, increasing the FFT size significantly improves the classification accuracy. The PSD feature requires significantly more training samples per class when compared to our proposed beam pattern feature. Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 shows the 2-dimensional embedding of the output weights learned by the CNN classifier for the beam pattern feature 3 APs case and the PSD feature with 1024 FFT, respectively. The 12 devices form 12 distinct clusters indicating the beam pattern feature and the PSD feature are unique among devices and the classifier was able to learn the representations of the features to form distinct clusters.
C. Identification Results
During the identification phase, the claimed identity (e.g., MAC address) of the device is authenticated by performing feature extraction and comparing it with the feature of the claimed device stored in the fingerprint database. In this section, we compare the identification performance of our proposed beam pattern feature with the PSD feature for various scenarios.
1) Stationary:
This experiment pertains to scenarios involving communication between laptops and APs in office, conference and living room scenarios, where the devices are kept stationary with respect to their position and orientation [30] . All the devices are tested with the same position and orientation in the location depicted as star symbol in Fig. 7a . The following 12 devices are used in this experiment: Talon1, Talon2, Talon3, Netgear1, Netgear2, Acer1, Intel1, Intel2, Intel3, Intel4, Intel5, Intel6. At each AP, a 1000 feature vector per device is obtained and split into training, validation and test sets of 35%, 15% and 50% respectively. Fig. 15a shows the ROC curves for 1 AP and 3 APs scenario for the beam pattern feature. We see that the area under the ROC curve (ROC-AUC) is 0.998 and 0.999 for 1 AP and 3 APs case respectively. The EERs for all the devices are < 1% for both 1 AP and 3 APs case. For the beam pattern feature, we see that, as long as the device is fingerprinted and identified in the same orientation, the overall accuracy is 99.6% and 99.9% for 1 AP and 3 APs case respectiveley. Fig. 15b shows the ROC curve for 4096 FFT PSD feature based identification. The ROC-AUC for 128, 256, 1024, and 4096 FFT PSD are all over 0.99. The EERs are < 1% for all the devices and all FFT size PSD features. The average identification accuracies for PSD feature with 128, 256, 1024 and 4096 FFT are 97%, 98.4%, 99%, and 99.1% respectively. A closer look at the identification performance reveals that for 128 FFT and 256 FFT, some of the Intel based devices identification accuracy is as low as 89% and 95% respectively. Hence for PSD feature fingerprinting, higher FFT size on the order of 1024 is needed to achieve an identification accuracy of over 99%, which significantly increases the complexity of the fingerprinting system when compared to beam pattern feature based system.
2) Effect of Channel: In practical scenarios, the line-of-sight of the device to be identified might be blocked by obstacles in the environment and only NLOS might be available. Experiments are performed to assess the identification performance under such NLOS scenarios. The user devices are positioned at a location identified as NLOS behind a cubicle partition as shown in Fig. 7a . Among the 3 APs, only AP2 is in LOS with respect to the user devices. The orientation and position of all the devices are kept the same. The following devices are tested in this experiment: Talon1, Talon2, Netgear1, Acer1, Intel1, Intel2, Intel3, Intel4, intel5, Intel6. 1000 feature vector per device at each AP is obtained. The database is split into training, validation and test set with 35%, 15%, and 50% respectively. Fig.15c shows the ROC curve for the beam pattern feature in NLOS scenario. Due to space constraints, we show the ROC curves only for the NLOS AP namely AP3 and 3 APs case. Only 6 devices have EER < 5% for the NLOS AP 3. For the 3 APs case, the EERs of all the devices are < 1%. For the single AP case, we see that the performance depends on the location of the AP. The average identification accuracy across all the devices are 95.7%, 99.2% and 94.2% at AP1, AP2 and AP3 respectively. The average identification accuracy for 3APs case is 99.5%. Employing multiple APs significantly increases the identification accuracy in the NLOS case. For the PSD feature, we report the metric for only 4096 FFT PSD due to space constraints. The ROC curves for PSD feature under NLOS scenario at NLOS AP3 and LOS AP2 is presented in Fig. 15d . The EERs are all < 1% for the LOS AP2 and < 5% for the NLOS AP3. The average identification accuracies are 94%, 99% and 94% at AP1, AP2 and AP3 respectively. We see that, the beam pattern feature is robust to NLOS and the identification accuracy is significantly higher than the PSD feature in the NLOS scenario.
3) Effect of SNR:
We analyze the performance of beam pattern feature and PSD feature for different SNR levels. We test the following six devices: Talon1, Talon2, Talon3, Netgear1, Netgear2, Acer1. We obtained 750 feature vectors per device at an SNR of 25 dB and 250 feature vectors per device at each of 10 dB, 15 dB, and 20 dB SNR values. For the PSD feature, training is performed with 25 dB data set. Testing is performed at 10 dB, 15 dB and 20 dB. For the beam pattern feature, we consider two scenarios: 1) training at 25 dB and testing at 10 dB, 15 dB, and 20 dB and 2) training at 10 dB and testing at 15 dB, 20 dB, and 25 dB. Since the beam pattern feature is obtained during the beam searching process of the devices, the term SNR here refers to the SNR of the beam with the highest SNR. Fig. 16a shows the overall identification accuracy of the beam pattern feature at different SNR values. When the devices are trained at 25 dB SNR, the identification accuracy of some of the devices at lower SNR values decreases. Fig. 16b shows the identification accuracy of individual devices at different SNR values when the devices are trained at 25 dB SNR. We can see that at 10 dB SNR, the identification accuracy of Talon2 is 2% and Netgear1 is 94.8%. The identification accuracy of all the other devices are over 98%. For SNR values of 15 dB and 20 dB, the identification accuracy of Talon2 is 0% and 95.5%, respectively. On the other hand, from Fig. 16c when the beam pattern feature system is trained at a 10 dB SNR, the system has remarkable identification accuracy across all the SNR values and the average identification accuracy is over 96% for all the SNR values. This is due to the fact that neural networks trained on noisy observations performs better than networks trained on cleaner observations [31] . For the PSD feature, from Fig. 16d we see that the overall identification accuracy increases with increase in SNR. PSD feature with 256 FFT length is found to give best identification accuracy with 90% at 10 dB SNR and 99% at 25 dB SNR. We see that beam pattern feature based fingerprinting system trained at lower SNR scenario gives significantly higher device identification accuracy than PSD based identification system.
4) Effect of Mobility:
We conduct comprehensive experiments to understand the impact of mobility on the identification system. The mobility model is adopted from IEEE 802.11ay channel model [32] Fig. 17a shows the average identification accuracy at each of the positions tested. When there is a line-of-sight to the receiver with no blockages and strong reflectors, the identification accuracy is over 99% for all positions except position D which is 96%. Fig. 17b shows the ROC curves for all the positions. The AUC is over 99% for all the positions tested. The EERs of all the devices are < 1%.
Impact of Mobility on Identification:
The identification accuracy of the beam pattern feature based identification system depends on the orientation of the device to be identified. If the device orientation changes, different from the training fingerprint, the accuracy drastically decreases. We looked at the impact of orientation change on a beam pattern feature fingerprinting system by training in one fixed direction. The devices are identified from a direction other than the one trained. The following devices are tested: Talon1, Talon2, Talon3, Netgear1, Acer1, Intel1, Intel2, Intel3, Intel4. Fig. 18 shows the confusion matrix for such a scenario. The fingerprinting system could not discriminate the devices and the average accuracy is 25%. It suggests that beam pattern feature is extremely sensitive to orientation and position change. Hence, it is essential to learn as many orientations in the beam pattern as possible through device mobility (see Sec. II-D).
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
It is generally believed that physical layer security which relies on unique device dependent features generated by hardware imperfections of the RF chain and the antenna module is hard to forge. However due to the availability of high end software defined radios and waveform generators, physical layer features are prone to attacks such as feature and signal replay. Also, the novel beam pattern feature proposed in section II-B introduces an additional attack vector unique to mmWave wireless systems.
In this section, we study the security of our proposed beam pattern based device identification method and PSD feature based device identification against impersonation attacks.
Threat Model:
The goal of Mallory M is to gain access to the wireless network by impersonating the identity of a legitimate user Bob in the network. Mallory may achieve this goal in 2 stages: (1) eavesdropping, and (2) signal impersonation.
Before proceeding to describe the attack stages, we make the following assumptions about Mallory: (a) Mallory possesses a millimeter wave RF transceiver (Sec III-A2) and has the knowledge of the communication channel (60.48 GHz in our experiments) used by Alice and Bob. The active communication channel could also be deduced by RF sensing the environment. (b) Mallory can use both directional antenna and quasiomni antenna for eavesdropping and impersonation attacks.
During the eavesdropping stage, Mallory records the beam searching beacons of Bob whose identity she aims to fake using quasi-omni antenna.
Mallory could simply record the beam searching beacons of Bob as long as she is in the communication range of Bob.
Followed by the eavesdropping stage, Mallory initiates signal impersonation stage. Mallory replays the recorded beacons from Bob either unchanged or after modifying the signal. Here too Mallory can choose between a directional and quasi-omni antenna pattern. During the impersonation stage, Mallory's objective is to replay the signal towards the access point Alice.
Here we make the assumption that Mallory knows the location of Alice and hence can direct her transmit beam towards Alice using directional beam pattern.
A. Impersonation of Antenna Pattern Feature
In this section, we describe the antenna pattern feature impersonation attack. 
1) Experimental Setting:
We used the X60 node described in Sec. III-A2 to capture the beacons from the legitimate device Bob. The receiver's antenna is configured in the quasiomni mode for capturing the beacons. The fingerprinting AP positions are as shown in Fig. 7a . The legitimate device is placed at a position 3 meters from the AP 1. The attacker's receiver is placed directly behind the fingerprinting AP 1 to capture the beacons. The captured baseband complex samples are then transfered to the host computer and saved in a file. The captured beacons are read from the file and transfered from the host computer to the FPGA in the X60 used for replay. The baseband I/Q samples are then upconverted to IF and then to 60.48 GHz. The attackers transmitter is configured to use directional antenna with beam pattern shown in Fig.19a . The beacons are replayed from a position behind the legitimate transmitter Bob.
2) Attack on Classification and Identification System: Here we look at the security implications of antenna pattern feature signal replay attack on our proposed classification and identification system. In particular we explore whether the attacker was able to spoof the classifier in assigning the beam pattern feature extracted from the replayed signals to the targeted device class. For this experiment, the classifier in Sec. II-F is trained with training data from all the 12 devices. We choose three of the 12 devices (Talon1, Acer1, and Intel3) as the target devices and replay 250 sets of beam searching beacons from each of the target device using the attacker. We record the replayed beacon frames from the attacker at the three AP positions. The replayed frames are passed to the trained classifier and the identification accuracy is evaluated. The attack is evaluated for both 1 AP and 3 APs case. Fig. 20a show the percentage of frames and their associated target probabilites assigned by the classifier for three target devices for both 1 AP and 3 APs case. For the Talon1 and Acer1 attacks, we find that for single AP scenario, the attacker was successfully able to spoof the classifier with 100% accuracy and more importantly the replayed frames are classified with 99% probability as those belonging to the targeted device. But for Intel3 device attack, 60% and 5% of the replayed frames are assigned with probabilites 0.9 and 0.8 respectively as targeted device Intel3. The remaining 35% of the replayed frames are misidentifed as some other device. The overall attack success rate for Intel3 device is 65%. We found that the beam pattern vector extracted from the replayed frames deviates from the beam pattern of the legitimate device at few positions in the extracted feature vector due to the attacker transmitter not being able to accurately represent those beacons. To improve the attack success rate in such scenarios, we adopted an approach similar to the hill-climbing attack [33] in biometric systems. In a hill-climbing attack, the attacker repeatedly replays the signal each time with slight modifications until the system accepts it as genuine. Similar approach could be used to attack our beam pattern feature by crafting the beacons to be replayed. Implementing such an attack for our beam pattern replay is a daunting task as the feature vector is high dimensional with length depending on the number of codebooks used by the device. Therefore, we designed a coordinated attack in which we placed another attacker receiver behind the AP we want to impersonate. The attacker receiver has a copy of the signal to be replayed. The attacker receiver records the replayed signal from the attacker transmitter and compares with the one transmitted. In that way the attacker knows which beacon signal need to be crafted to improve the attack success rate. Using the signal crafting approach, the success rate for attack on Intel3 is 100%. As mentioned in [11] , the success of the attacker to impersonate a target device in identification accuracy highly depends on the number of devices used. For larger number of devices, the classification boundary becomes obscure and the percentage of attacker replayed signals successfully assigned to the target device will decrease.
In practical scenarios, the attacker could only target 1 AP to spoof at a time. Figure 20a show the percentage of frames and their associated target probabilites assigned by the classifier for three target devices for the 3 APs case. We see that for all the three targeted devices, the replayed frames are assigned probabilites < 1% as targeted device and the attacker was not able to spoof the 3 APs fingerprinting system.
B. Impersonation of Spectral Feature
In this section, we discuss the impersonation of the spectral feature for mmWave devices discussed in Section IV.
1) Experiment Setting: In our spectral feature impersonation experiment, the attacker records the beacons and replays them in a set up same as in Sec. V-A.
2) Attack on Classification and Identification System: The identification system is trained with the classifier in Sec. II-F and the training set consists of a spectral feature fingerprint database from all the 12 devices. Four different spectral feature identification systems are considered: spectral feature with 128 FFT, 256 FFT, 1024 FFT, and 4096 FFT. The spectral feature impersonation attack is performed for each of the identification system. The impersonation attack is targeted for three legitimate devices named Acer1, Talon1, Talon2 from the enrolled devices. For each device, a total of 250 frames are replayed. The spectral feature for different FFT length is extracted from the 250 frames and submitted to the identification system. Figure 20b show the output probabilities assigned to the replayed frames for 4096 FFT spectral feature impersonation attack on Talon1, Talon2 and Acer1 devices. Over 30% of the replayed frames are accepted as genuine frames with high probability over 0.9. The overall impersonation success rate for 4096 FFT spectral feature attack are 63%, 64% and 53% for Acer1, Talon1 and Talon2 respectively. The impersonation success rate for impersonation attack on 128 FFT, 256 FFT and 1024 FFT spectral feature are 42%, 43.3%, and 50% respectively for Acer1 device. For Talon1, they are 35%, 35.8%, and 53.3% for 128 FFT, 256 FFT, and 1024 FFT respectively. For Talon2, they are 30%, 31% and 41% for 128 FFT, 256 FFT and 1024 FFT respectively. We noticed that as the FFT resolution goes down, the success rate of attack also lowers. This trend is observed for all the devices we impersonated. The reason for this is that, with lower FFT resolution feature, the classification and identification accuracy also reduces. This leads to reduction in attack success rate as some of the replayed frames are incorrectly identified as devices other than the one impersonated.
C. Security Implications
Our findings suggest that similar to the PSD feature and other conventional features [11] , our proposed beam pattern feature too is vulnerable to impersonation attacks. However, by utilizing multiple views of the beam pattern to authenticate a legitimate user, such attacks can be defeated. We see that the beam pattern feature with multiple views has higher resilience to impersonation attacks than the PSD feature. Robustness of beam pattern feature to impersonation attacks has several implications in mmWave wireless networks security. MmWave devices could be authenticated using beam pattern physical layer feature during the beam searching process. Thus, attacks such as [6] could be prevented by accepting the sector sweep feedback frame from the device only if it has been authenticated as originating from the legitimate device.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a novel beam pattern feature for fingerprinting mmWave devices. The proposed beam pattern feature is contributed by the fabrication process of the antenna array and the phase shifters used in the mmWave devices. We showed that, the directionality of mmWave devices poses additional significant challenges in the training as well as in the identification process. Comprehensive training is necessary to achieve an acceptable classification and identification accuracy under mobility conditions. To that end, we proposed a multiple APs fingerprinting architecture that exploits the rich spatial features of the beam patterns used by the mmWave devices. We also presented a conventional PSD feature for mmWave devices and compared our proposed beam pattern feature with it. We performed extensive experiments under various realworld scenarios to confirm the effectiveness and reliability of the proposed beam pattern feature.
We have also investigated the robustness of our proposed beam pattern feature to impersonation attacks. We designed and implemented our attacker on a 60 GHz mmWave testbed and performed signal replay attack on the proposed beam pattern and spectral features. We show that the impersonation attack on the beam pattern feature for a single AP system is almost always feasible with high success rate while for the multiple APs system it is unsuccessful. For the spectral feature impersonation attack, the degree of success varies highly from 40% to 60%. This suggests that the beam pattern feature is robust and secure when compared to a conventional PSD based scheme.
